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Condorcet meets Ellsberg
Andrew Ellis
Department of Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science
The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maxi-
mization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candi-
date wins goes to 1 as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper stud-
ies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity
averse—exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior—as modeled by maxmin expected utility
preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability
of the correct candidate winning the election is bounded above by 12 in at least one
state. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which information aggregates.
Keywords. Ambiguity, voting, elections, information aggregation.
JEL classification. D72, D81.
1. Introduction
The Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that elections can reduce uncertainty by aggregat-
ing the electorate’s private information. Roughly, it states that if voters maximize sub-
jective expected utility (henceforth, SEU) and have common values, then there exists an
equilibrium to the voting game in which all private information is revealed for a large
enough electorate.1 However, the correct policy often depends on events about which
the electorate has only vague information—ambiguous events—and the literature, e.g.,
Ellsberg (1961), argues that SEU does not accurately describe preferences under ambi-
guity. This paper studies whether elections aggregate information with ambiguity averse
voters.
My main result shows that many pure common values voting games with ambigu-
ity averse voters have no equilibrium in which information aggregates, regardless of the
size of the electorate. Information aggregation fails when each voter’s private informa-
tion is not precise enough to reduce her prior uncertainty sufficiently. A rational voter
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takes into account the probability that her vote changes the outcome of the election, and
her equilibrium strategy may differ from the action that her private information alone
would suggest is best. If voters are SEU, then each vote noisily reveals private informa-
tion, and with enough voters, information aggregates. An ambiguity averse voter may
instead minimize the probability of casting a pivotal vote because she overweights the
probability that her choice alters the outcome in favor of the worse candidate. To do so,
she plays a mixed strategy, and in equilibrium, no vote reveals information, precluding
information aggregation.
Many important policy decisions are made under ambiguity.2 A policy to cap car-
bon emissions deals with poorly understood costs, base case emissions, and tails of the
probability distribution of temperature changes. The recession of 2008–2009 resulted at
least in part from an unprecedented event (systematic default in AAA rated bonds) in the
credit market. The Federal Reserve decided whether to bail out banks and hedge funds
based on their beliefs about the poorly understood connection between this default,
these companies, and the financial system as a whole. Many foreign policy decisions
must be made despite possessing only poor quality information, such as that leading to
the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
Agents are typically ambiguity averse—they prefer betting on unambiguous events
to ambiguous ones. For example, a bet on an event E, which is known to occur with
probability 12 , may be preferred both to a bet on the event F and a bet on its complement
Fc when no information is provided about F . Ambiguity aversion explains evidence
from asset markets that contradicts SEU (see, e.g., Epstein and Schneider 2010). To ac-
commodate ambiguity aversion, I assume voters conform to maxmin expected utility
(henceforth, MEU; axiomatized in Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). Each voter consid-
ers a set of probability measures and evaluates an act by taking its minimum expected
utility with respect to every measure in that set, i.e., has a utility function of the form
U(f) = minπ∈Eπ[u ◦ f ], where  is a set of probability measures and u(·) is a utility
index.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an example illustrating the mecha-
nism by which ambiguity aversion precludes information aggregation. Section 3 intro-
duces the model, and Section 4 presents the paper’s main results. Theorem 1 shows that
ambiguity aversion can preclude the existence of any equilibrium that aggregates infor-
mation. Theorem 2 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
that aggregates information. Section 5 explores the robustness of the result. Theorem 3
shows that information may fail to aggregate even if voters strategically abstain. Sec-
tion 6 concludes by relating the main results to other works that show failure of infor-
mation aggregation in voting games. Proofs are collected in the Appendix. Additional
information and calculations are available in a supplementary file on the journal web-
site, http://econtheory.org/supp/1284/supplement.pdf.
2Previous work that addresses political economy questions with ambiguity averse voters or candidates
include Berliant and Konishi (2005), Ghirardato and Katz (2006), and Bade (2011), though none considers
strategic interaction between voters.
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2. Sincere voting and ambiguity
This section offers an example illustrating the mechanism by which ambiguity aversion
alters voter behavior. In Section 4, I show that this mechanism precludes information
aggregation as an equilibrium outcome in many voting games with ambiguity averse
players. I defer formal details to Section 3.
Consider an election with 101 voters who vote for one of two candidates, A and B.
The candidate with the most votes wins. There are two states of the world, a and b, and
all voters agree that A’s policy is better in state a but B’s policy is better in state b. Voters
are uncertain about which state obtains and conform to MEU with the set of priors, ,
that contains measures assigning a marginal probability of a ranging from
¯
p to p¯, where
¯
p= 1− p¯. Before voting, each voter observes a signal from the set {12}. Signal 1 occurs
with probability 06 in state a, signal 2 occurs with probability 06 in state b, and signals
are independently distributed conditional on the state of the world. After observing sig-
nal t, each voter considers the set of posteriors t consisting of the Bayesian update of
each measure in . Each voter gets utility equal to 1 if the correct candidate is elected
and 0 otherwise. Letting σ denote the strategy profile, all voters have the same ex ante
preference, represented by
min
π∈
π(correct candidate wins|σ)
Because of the symmetry of beliefs about states and signals, a voter (strictly) prefers
to bet on a over b if she observes signal 1 and vice versa if she observes signal 2. If all
voters who observe 1 vote for A and all those who observe 2 vote for B, then information
aggregates.3 If voters are SEU (
¯
p = p¯ = 12 ), then Theorem 1 of McLennan (1998) shows
that this sincere voting strategy is an equilibrium. However when
¯
p < 04 and 06 < p¯,
this strategy is not an equilibrium because all players best respond by voting for both A
and B with equal probability.
For instance, suppose that
¯
p = 039 and p¯ = 061. After updating, a player who ob-
serves signal 1 (respectively, 2) considers the marginal probability of state a (b) to be in
the interval [04907]. Consider the problem of an arbitrary voter when all others vote
sincerely. If this voter observes signal 1, then she picks her strategy to maximize
min
p∈[04907]
[pPr(A wins|a)+ (1−p)Pr(B wins|b)]
She affects the outcome only when she is pivotal, or when exactly 50 of the others vote
for A. Since all others vote sincerely,
Pr(A has 50 votes|a)= Pr(B has 50 votes|b)=
(
100
50
)
06500450 = ρ
and
Pr(51+ votes for A|a)= Pr(51+ votes for B|b)=
100∑
j=51
(
100
j
)
06j04100−j = θ
3The probability the correct candidate wins is about 0979 in either state.
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If she votes for A with probability α, then
Pr(A wins|a)= θ+ ρα and Pr(B wins|b)= θ+ ρ(1− α)
Therefore, this voter’s utility from voting for A with probability α is
V (α)= min
p∈[04907]
p[αρ+ θ] + (1−p)[(1− α)ρ+ θ]
It is easy to see that V (·) is a continuous, piecewise linear function with slope equal
to (04)ρ when α < 12 and equal to −(002)ρ when α > 12 . Since V (·) increases with α
when α< 12 and decreases with α when α>
1
2 , voting for A and B with equal probability
maximizes her utility.
This randomization insures her against ambiguity, and she strictly prefers it to any
pure strategy, an impossibility under SEU. Intuitively, randomizing minimizes the prob-
ability that she makes a mistake. Conditional on being pivotal, she thinks that she makes
a mistake with probability as high as 051 by voting for A or as high as 07 by voting for B,
but by mixing, she makes a mistake with precisely probability 05. Ambiguity aversion
implies that she strictly prefers the mixed strategy. Hence, her best response is to ran-
domize between voting for A and B regardless of the signal she observes, and sincere
voting fails to be an equilibrium. A symmetric argument to the above shows that the
voter also prefers to mix in this way after observing signal 2. Should the whole electorate
play this strategy, information could not aggregate because no individual’s vote reveals
the underlying signal. Indeed, all voters randomizing as above is an equilibrium to the
game (Proposition 1).
That sincere voting fails to be an equilibrium is not in itself surprising: Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996) show this is typically the case even with SEU voters. However, Theo-
rem 1 shows that there is no equilibrium to the above game in which information aggre-
gates. If there were a strategy profile in which information aggregates, then each voter
best responds to it as above, by mixing to minimize the probability that she makes a
mistake.
3. The model
This section formally introduces the class of games studied and defines the equilibrium
concept. I then discuss the modeling assumptions, focusing on the set of priors consid-
ered. Finally, I show how the behavior of MEU voters differs from SEU voters.
Candidates A and B have committed to distinct policies in an unmodeled stage be-
fore the game begins. There are two payoff relevant states, S = {ab}, and there is a finite
set I = {1    2n+1} of voters, where n is a nonnegative integer. All voters agree that the
policy of A is better in state a but that the policy of B is better in state b. Voter i receives
utility ui(c s) if candidate c wins the election and s ∈ S obtains, where
ui(Aa)= ui(Bb)= 1
and
ui(Ab)= ui(Ba)= 0
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for each i. The realized state of the world is initially unknown to all voters, but before
taking any action, each observes a signal from a finite set T that has at least two ele-
ments. Voters simultaneously either cast a vote for candidate A (take action A) or cast a
vote for candidate B (take action B). The candidate with the most votes wins the election
and implements the policy to which she committed.
Up to this point, all assumptions follow previous work closely. I depart from the liter-
ature by allowing voters to perceive ambiguity regarding the payoff relevant state. Each
voter conforms to MEU and considers a common set of priors , a closed and convex set
of probability distributions over the underlying state space 
= S × TI .4 Voters assign a
marginal probability to a between
¯
p and p¯, where 0<
¯
p≤ p¯ < 1. Conditional on state s,
the signal that voter i observes is distributed according to the distribution rs. Formally,
π ∈ if and only if there exists a p ∈ [
¯
p p¯] so that
π(a t)= p
2n+1∏
i=1
ra(ti) and π(b t)= (1−p)
2n+1∏
i=1
rb(ti)
for all (s t) ∈ 
. I discuss properties of and justification for this set of priors in Sec-
tion 3.1. Any collection  = (I [
¯
p p¯]T ra rb) as above defines an ambiguous voting
game. An ambiguous voting game where p¯ =
¯
p corresponds to a standard SEU voting
game.
Voters form a set of posteriors by updating each measure in  according to Bayes
rule. For any event E, let (·|E) = {π(·|E) : π ∈ }, so if voter i observes signal ti, then
she forms the set of posteriors (·|ti). Denoting the vector of signals seen by other voters
as t−i, Bayes rule gives that πti is a member of (·|ti) if and only if there exists
p ∈
[
¯
pti =
ra(ti) ¯
p
ra(ti) ¯
p+ rb(ti)(1− ¯
p)
 p¯ti =
ra(ti)p¯
ra(ti)p¯+ rb(ti)(1− p¯)
]
so that
πti(a ti t−i)= p
∏
j =i
ra(tj) and πti(b ti t−i)= (1−p)
∏
j =i
rb(tj)
for every (s t) ∈
.5
After observing signal ti, voter i chooses the strategy σi(ti), a probability distribution
over {AB} so that voter i votes for candidate c with probability σi(ti)(c). A strategy
profile is a vector denoting the strategy of every player conditional on every signal; as
is standard, denote by σ−i the vector (σj)j∈I\{i}. Her strategy combines with σ−i and
the conditional distribution of signals to yield a set of probabilities of electing A in a
and of electing B in b. She evaluates σi(t) by the minimum probability of electing the
correct candidate according to these probabilities and her beliefs; specifically, she gets
4That is, 
 encapsulates both the payoff relevant state as well as the signal that each voter receives.
5Since π(a ti t−i|ti)= pra(ti)/(pra(ti)+ (1−p)rb(ti))
∏
j =i ra(tj) is increasing in p, the maximum occurs
at p= p¯ and the minimum occurs at p=
¯
p.
870 Andrew Ellis Theoretical Economics 11 (2016)
utility
Vti(σi(ti)σ−i) = min
π∈
Eπ[ui|tiσi(ti)σ−i]
(1)
= min
π∈
π(correct candidate wins|σi(t)σ−i ti)
conditional on other voters playing the strategy profile σ−i and on observing the sig-
nal ti.
A strategy profile is an equilibrium if each voter chooses the best strategy given her
set of posteriors about the play of other voters.
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ∗ is an equilibrium if for each player i and each sig-
nal t,
σ∗i (ti) ∈ argmax
σˆ
Vti (σˆσ
∗
−i)
If σ∗ is an equilibrium, then every player chooses a strategy that maximizes her util-
ity, i.e., the minimum probability that the correct candidate wins, given her updated
beliefs and that the other players follow the strategy profile σ∗. When  is singleton, this
definition is equivalent to the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This solution con-
cept specializes Lo’s (1996, 1999) “beliefs equilibrium with agreement” so that Nature is
a player and in which all players, except Nature, choose an unambiguous strategy. Na-
ture, who gets the same utility from every outcome, chooses an action in 
, and the set
 describes other player’s beliefs about Nature’s chosen action.
Since nothing distinguishes one voter from another except information, I focus on
symmetric strategy profiles. A strategy profile σ is symmetric if σi = σi′ for all players i
and i′; when σ is symmetric, I abuse notation slightly by writing σ(ti) instead of “σi(ti)
for an arbitrary i.” My solution concept is a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile
that is both symmetric and an equilibrium. This is the standard solution concept in
voting games (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996,
1997, or Myerson 1998). A symmetric equilibrium (and thus an equilibrium) exists for
every ambiguous voting game. For example, whenever there are at least three voters,
every player voting for candidate A with probability 1, regardless of the signal observed,
is a symmetric equilibrium.6
I interpret mixed strategies as objective randomization.7 When each voter selects
her strategy, the state of the world is realized but unknown. Ambiguity averse players
act as if Nature picked the distribution in  that minimizes her utility given her strat-
egy. A mixed strategy substitutes objective risk for subjective uncertainty, smoothing
utility across states and limiting her exposure to Nature’s choice. Consequently, she may
6Other equilibria typically exist; see Proposition 1 or Theorem 2.
7Alternative interpretations include the Harsanyi (1973) idea that the strategy of player i represents the
uncertainty of the other players about the action of player i. The strategy of an SEU player is nondegenerate
only if strategies of other players make her indifferent between all actions in its support. An MEU player
values hedging, so her optimal strategy may assign positive probability to two actions with different payoffs.
This implies that one cannot purify mixed strategies with small utility shocks.
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strictly prefer a mixed strategy to any pure strategy.8 For a more in depth discussion of
mixed strategies in games with MEU players, see Lo (1996) or Klibanoff (1996).
3.1 The set of priors
I focus on the class of sets of priors above because any member is characterized by the
following three properties.
First, voters are symmetric. Formally, both (·|a) and (·|b) have the same set of
marginals on Ti as on Tj for all i j ∈ I. This assumption, standard in the literature, makes
the games tractable to analyze.
Second, the signals of two voters have known conditional distributions that make
each (conditionally) independent of the other. In fact, the model collapses to a SEU vot-
ing game conditional on either state of the world. This assumption simplifies exposition
and gives information the best chance to aggregate. To see why, note that if all private
information were public and ra = rb, then uncertainty vanishes for a large enough elec-
torate. Even under SEU, relaxing conditional independence can lead to failure of infor-
mation aggregation; see, e.g., Mandler (2012). Additionally, calculating the probability,
conditional on either state, that she is pivotal or that a given candidate wins the election
is tractable for a symmetric strategy profile.
Third, the set of priors has a natural structure in a dynamic setting. Although the
model considered is essentially static because agents take no ex ante action, uncertainty
has an implicit dynamic component. In voting games, the uncertainty is naturally mod-
eled as a two stage process. In the first stage, s ∈ {ab} is determined. In the second
stage, the signal of each voter is determined through a process that may depend on the
realization of s in the first stage.9 The set of priors is rectangular (Epstein and Schneider
2003) with respect to the natural filtration of an outsider who observes the outcome of
each stage in order.10
Players perceive information in a different order than that of an outside observer and
so do not have rectangular priors. As a consequence, and as in most games with incom-
plete information and ambiguity, voters violate dynamic consistency.11 In equilibrium,
each voter chooses an interim optimal strategy—the best strategy given her observed
signal without consideration of counterfactual signal realizations. I focus on interim
optimality rather than ex ante optimality because a voter’s first decision takes place af-
ter she observes her signal, i.e., no meaningful action takes place ex ante. In this sense,
the game is essentially static. While one could extend the model to allow for a voter to
commit to a plan of action at an ex ante state, this is undesirable. Signals may not be ob-
servable, and even if they are, they may not be contractible. Even if signals are feasible to
contract upon, enforcing a (conditional) commitment to vote for a given candidate likely
8Raiffa (1961) first observes that objective randomization reduces ambiguity, and the uncertainty aver-
sion axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is often interpreted as a strict preference for randomization.
9Although the order of the stages matters for MEU, it does not for SEU.
10Specifically, F0 = {
} and F1 = {{a} × T 2n+1 {b} × T 2n+1}.
11Given a common set of priors, dynamic consistency and consequentialism for all players is a very de-
manding condition that fails in, among others, Salo and Weber (1995), Lo (1998), Bose et al. (2006), Chen
et al. (2007), Bose and Daripa (2009), Bodoh-Creed (2012), and Bose and Renou (2014).
872 Andrew Ellis Theoretical Economics 11 (2016)
gives rise undesirable social consequences: almost all democratic countries have secret
balloting for a reason. In fact, offering a voter a contract that commits her to follow a
given plan would almost certainly violate U.S. law.12
Special attention needs to be paid to the value of randomization in the absence of
dynamic consistency. Given that voters know the outcome of their own randomization
before they vote and that uncertainty has not resolved, they may prefer to play the ran-
domization again rather than its realization. However, past realizations provide no new
information and thus do not alter her preferences, so should she randomize again, she
does so with the same distribution. Provided that she must vote eventually, her final
vote should still obey the distribution of the initially chosen optimal randomization. Al-
ternatively, Machina (1989) argues in a different context that unwillingness to revisit the
choice is a reasonable property in the absence of expected utility.
3.2 Pivot probabilities and voting behavior
When choosing for whom to cast her ballot, voter i cares only about how others vote, not
their type. Of particular importance is the event that she is pivotal, i.e., of the 2n other
voters, exactly n vote for each candidate. If voter i is pivotal, then her vote determines
the outcome of the election. If voter i is not pivotal, then her vote affects neither the
winner of the election nor the policy implemented.
Given a symmetric strategy profile σ , the probability of a given player voting for can-
didate c conditional on state s equals
τ(c|σ s)=
∑
t∈T
rs(t)σ(t)(c)
and this probability is independent across voters. This allows decomposition of the util-
ity in terms of the pivot probability conditional on state s,
ρs(σ)=
(
2n
n
)
τ(c|σ s)n[1− τ(c|σ s)]n
and the probability that the correct candidate wins the election in state s regardless,
θs(σ)=
2n∑
m=n+1
(
2n
m
)
τ(c|σ s)m[1− τ(c|σ s)]2n−m
where candidate c is the preferred winner in state s. Given this notation, (1) can be
rewritten as
Vti(σˆσ−i)= min
q∈[
¯
pti p¯ti ]
{
q[σˆ(A)ρa(σ)+ θa(σ)] + (1− q)[σˆ(B)ρb(σ)+ θb(σ)]
}
 (2)
12Section 597 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code states that any person who “makes or offers to make an ex-
penditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate” has
committed a felony.
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As in the SEU case, pivot probabilities affect voter behavior; for instance, if the voter is
much more likely to be pivotal in state b, i.e., ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) ≈ 0, then no player votes for
candidate A.
Nevertheless, (2) reveals a key difference between the behavior of MEU and SEU
voters: the probabilities that the correct candidate wins the election in each state (θa(σ)
and θb(σ)) affect the behavior of MEU but not SEU voters. As previous work emphasizes,
SEU voters update their beliefs based on the probability that they are pivotal, so θa(σ)
and θb(σ) are conditioned out of the utility function. This is an as if result that fails
for MEU voters.13 For an MEU voter, θa(σ) and θb(σ) play a role in determining which
probability measure minimizes the payoff to her strategy. As a consequence, the pivot
probabilities in alone are not sufficient to determine her best response.14
To illustrate, suppose that there exist two strategy profiles σ1 and σ2 so that θa(σ1) >
θb(σ1)+ ρb(σ1), θa(σ2)+ ρa(σ2) > θb(σ2) and ρa(σ1)/ρb(σ1)= ρa(σ2)/ρb(σ2). The best
response of an SEU voter is the same when others play either σ1 or σ2. However, the
behavior of MEU voters may differ. When others play strategy profile σ1, the minimiz-
ing posterior in (2) assigns the smallest allowable probability to a, but when others play
strategy profile σ2, it assigns the smallest allowable probability to b. Because her mini-
mizing posterior differs, her best response differs as well.
This lack of equivalence has some similarity to an experimental finding of Esponda
and Vespa (2014). They show that subjects act differently when explicitly informed that
they are pivotal than in equivalent situations when uninformed. As their setting includes
only risk, the lack of equivalence is attributed to failure to think hypothetically rather
than ambiguity aversion. In this setting, conditioning on the pivotal event makes voters
more likely to hedge by mixing or abstaining.
4. Information aggregation
This section analyzes the properties of equilibria for ambiguous voting games. The two
main results give conditions on the beliefs of voters that either rule out aggregation of in-
formation in equilibrium (Theorem 1) or allow construction of a sequence of equilibria
as the number of players goes to infinity so that information aggregates (Theorem 2).
4.1 Information aggregation
Because there is always some possibility of a mistake in a finite electorate, one cannot re-
quire full certainty that voters elect the proper candidate in a given game. I focus on two
13Specifically, an SEU voter with prior π who sees signal t maximizes
Ut(σˆ)= π(a|t)[σˆ(A)ρa(σ)+ θa(σ)] +π(b|t)[σˆ(B)ρb(σ)+ θb(σ)]
One can subtract π(a|t)θa(σ)+ π(b|t)θb(σ) and multiply by [π(a|t)ρa(σ)+ π(b|t)ρb(σ)]−1 (both positive
affine transformations) to yield
Gt(σˆ)= σˆ(A)π(a|tpivotal)+ σˆ(B)π(b|tpivotal)
Consequently, σˆ maximizes Ut(·) if and only if σˆ maximizes Gt(·). The term Gt(·) is often referred to as the
gain from playing a strategy (relative to abstention).
14In the Supplement, I show that assuming that voters update each prior conditional on the pivotal event
does not alter the main result.
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definitions of information aggregation. The first applies to a single game and is a nec-
essary condition for the second, which applies to a sequence of games with population
approaching infinity.
The weaker definition requires that A has more expected votes than B in state a and
B has more expected votes than A in state b.
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ has correct expected winners if
τ(A|σa) > τ(B|σa) and τ(B|σb) > τ(A|σb)
When voters play a strategy profile that has correct expected winners, the candi-
date whom voters prefer to win, i.e., A in state a or B in state b, wins with probability
greater than 12 . Existence of such an equilibrium strategy profile for all games with a
large enough population is a necessary condition to apply the law of large numbers and
conclude that information aggregates. Nonexistence of such an equilibrium strategy
profile implies more than just this inability to apply the law of large numbers. Specif-
ically, either A wins in state a or B wins in state b with probability of at least 12 in any
equilibrium, a stronger failure of information to aggregate.
The stronger definition follows the literature in studying sequences of voting games
for which the population of voters grows to infinity. Information aggregates if there ex-
ists a sequence of equilibria to the games along which the probability of electing the
wrong candidate vanishes. Throughout, any sequence of ambiguous voting games is in-
dexed by the number of players, with the understanding that all of the other primitives
remain the same.
Definition 3. For a sequence of ambiguous voting games (n)∞n=1, a sequence of strat-
egy profiles (σn)∞n=1 satisfies full information equivalence (FIE) if there exists an  > 0
and an N ∈R so that
τ(A|σna) > τ(B|σna)+  and τ(B|σnb) > τ(A|σnb)+ 
for all n >N .15
By the law of large numbers, the probability of A (resp. B) winning in state a (resp. b)
goes to 1 whenever the sequence of strategy profiles satisfies FIE. If σn is the member of
such a sequence and n >N , then σn has correct expected winners. Consequently, if each
equilibrium strategy profile does not have correct expected winners, then the sequence
fails to satisfy FIE.
If all signals were public and ra = rb, then voters would be arbitrarily certain which
candidate is correct for a large enough electorate. FIE for a sequence of strategy profiles
requires that the outcome of the election reflects this with a probability that goes to 1 as
the size of the electorate goes to infinity. That is, the outcome of the election reflects the
aggregation of all private information with an arbitrarily high probability.
15This definition is adapted from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997).
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4.2 Lack of confidence precludes information aggregation
This subsection describes a set of ambiguous voting games for which no equilibrium
aggregates information. Theorem 1 below shows that if voters lack confidence, then no
equilibrium aggregates information. Voters lack confidence when the following condi-
tion holds.
Definition 4. An ambiguous voting game has voters who lack confidence if for each
ti ∈ T , ¯
p/(1−
¯
p) < rb(ti)/ra(ti) < p¯/(1− p¯) or, equivalently, ¯
pt <
1
2 < p¯t .
After observing her signal, an SEU voter typically prefers to bet on one state rather
than to bet on the other at fair odds, interpreted as a belief that one state is more likely
than the other.16 An MEU voter may strictly prefer to take neither bet, interpreted as a
lack of confidence in her likelihood judgment. An ambiguous voting game has voters
who lack confidence when every voter strictly prefers to take neither bet, regardless of
the signal that she observes.
Voters lack confidence when signals do not provide enough information to reduce
the prior ambiguity sufficiently. The likelihood of b given ti is proportional to the ratio
rb(ti)/ra(ti). A very precise signal structure (there is some ti so that rb(ti)/ra(ti) is very
high or very low) can offset more ex ante uncertainty (a larger interval [
¯
p p¯]) than a very
imprecise signal structure (rb(ti)/ra(ti) close to 1 for all ti ∈ T ). If the signal structure is
imprecise relative to the degree of ex ante uncertainty, then voters lack confidence. To
illustrate concretely, consider the game in Section 2 where ra(1) = rb(2) = 06. Voters
lack confidence if and only if
¯
p < 04 and 06 < p¯. If instead ra(1) = rb(2) = 051 (a less
precise signal structure), then voters lack confidence whenever
¯
p < 049 and 051 < p¯.
If p¯ = 055 and
¯
p = 045, then voters lack confidence when ra(1) = rb(2) = 051 but not
when ra(1)= rb(2)= 06.
If voters lack confidence, then each has a preference to hedge her bet. Suppose a
voter strictly prefers a bet on a to a bet on b. If voters lack confidence, then she strictly
prefers a lottery that yields the bet on a with probability (1 − x) and the bet on b with
probability x, where x is small and positive, to a bet on a with probability 1. The small
probability of a bet on b hedges her bet on a by increasing her expected utility con-
ditional on b occurring, thereby decreasing her exposure to ambiguity. An SEU voter
never strictly prefers this type of hedge: if she prefers a bet on a to a bet on b, then the
independence axiom implies that a bet on a is at least as good as any lottery over the
two bets.
This translates into the voting setting as follows. Suppose an arbitrary voter is made
a dictator—whichever policy she chooses is implemented. If, irrespective of the sig-
nal she receives, she strictly prefers to pick a policy implemented by lottery rather than
implementing either policy for sure, then, and only then, voters lack confidence.
16Specifically, any SEU agent strictly prefers either to bet on a or to bet on b at sufficiently small stakes
rather than take no bet whenever her utility index is differentiable and her posterior probability of a is not
exactly 12 .
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Theorem 1. Any symmetric equilibrium to an ambiguous voting gamewhere voters lack
confidence does not have correct expected winners.
The result shows that if voters lack confidence, then no equilibrium of the game ag-
gregates information. It implies that in any symmetric equilibrium, the probability that
the correct candidate wins the election is bounded above by 12 in at least one state. The
result is valid for any number of voters, so it applies to both small committees and large
elections.17
Theorem 1 shows that the behavior demonstrated in Section 2, i.e., randomizing in
a manner that does not reveal information, precludes the existence of an equilibrium
with correct expected winners in every game that has voters who lack confidence. Intu-
itively, when others play a strategy profile for which information would aggregate and
voters lack confidence, no voter is confident that voting for either A or B would improve
the outcome of the election. Consequently, each prefers to insure herself against alter-
ing the outcome for the worse by mixing between voting for A and voting for B. More
specifically, pivot probabilities affect an MEU voter’s strategy in two ways: her incentive
to vote for A rather than for B increases as she becomes more likely to be pivotal in state
a relative to state b, and ambiguity aversion gives her an incentive to hedge against cast-
ing a pivotal vote for the worse candidate. The former increases the responsiveness of
the voter’s behavior to her signal, while the latter decreases it. Theorem 1 shows that
whenever both expected winners are correct and voters lack confidence, the hedging
motive dominates.
Before providing an outline of the proof, I first detail some properties of a voter’s best
response used therein. Ambiguity aversion qualitatively affects the voter’s best response
through a strict preference for randomization. If she strictly prefers to randomize be-
tween voting for A and B, then the posterior that minimizes her utility of voting for A
does not also minimize the utility of voting for B; see, e.g., Theorem 3 of Klibanoff (1996).
Thus a necessary condition for a strict preference to randomize is that the election is
close, in the sense that her strategy determines whether or not her utility conditional on
state a exceeds her utility conditional on state b. Given symmetry and independence,
either the election is close for all voters or the election is close for no voter.
The best response of a voter who observes signal ti, henceforth a ti-voter, depends
on the relationship between her set of posteriors and the ratio of the probability that her
vote is pivotal in state a to that in state b, ρa(σ)/ρb(σ). If the election is close and if sig-
nal ti does not sufficiently favor either a or b (specifically, (1− ¯
pti)/ ¯
pti > ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) >
(1− p¯ti )/p¯ti ), then a ti-voter strictly prefers to play the mixed strategy σins that equalizes
her utility conditional on each state. This strategy does not depend on the voter’s signal,
and σins(A)≥ 12 if and only if τ(B|σb)≥ τ(A|σa).18 When signal ti sufficiently favors a
or b, a ti-voter best responds by voting for A with higher (if it favors a) or lower (if it fa-
vors b) frequency than σins(A); when the election is close, she best responds by playing
A at least as frequently as σins(A) if ρa(σ)/ρb(σ)≥ (1− ¯
pti)/ ¯
pti and no more frequently
17An earlier version of this paper (Ellis 2012) shows that Theorem 1 is robust to the introduction of pop-
ulation uncertainty via a Poisson distribution.
18Specifically, σins(A)/σins(B)= (ρb(σ)+ θb(σ)− θa(σ))/(ρa(σ)+ θa(σ)− θb(σ)).
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if (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti ≥ ρa(σ)/ρb(σ). If the election is not close, then a ti-voter weakly prefers
to vote for A (resp. B) if and only if ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) is at least as large as (resp. no larger
than) (1−p)/p, where p equals
¯
p if utility is always higher conditional on a than on b
and
¯
p otherwise.
The following text outlines the proof. Suppose the result is false, so there exists a
symmetric equilibrium σ with correct expected winners. Since expected winners are
correct, there must exist signals tA and tB so that a tA-voter is more likely to vote for A
and a tB-voter is more likely to vote for B, i.e., σ(tA)(A) >
1
2 and σ(tB)(B) >
1
2 . The first
step shows that σ leads to a close election. The second step establishes that either the
tA-voter or the tB-voter is not best responding to σ .
To see why the first step holds, suppose to the contrary that utility is always higher
conditional on a than on b.19 Utility conditional on a is proportional to the probabil-
ity that A wins in state a. Since the probability that candidate c wins is proportional
to c’s vote share, utility is always higher conditional on a than on b only if τ(A|σa) >
τ(B|σb). As with SEU, the pivot probability in state s is inversely proportional to
the expected margin of victory for the winning candidate, i.e., |τ(A|σ s) − τ(B|σ s)|.
Since τ(A|σa) > τ(B|σb) and expected winners are correct, τ(A|σa) − τ(B|σa) >
τ(B|σb)− τ(A|σb) > 0, implying that pivot probability in state b exceeds that in a, i.e.,
ρb(σ) > ρa(σ). Because voters lack confidence, (1− ¯
ptA)/ ¯
ptA > 1> ρa(σ)/ρb(σ). How-
ever, a tA-voter best responds with σ(tA) only if she thinks state a is likely relative to the
ratio of pivot probabilities, specifically (1−
¯
ptA)/ ¯
ptA ≤ ρa(σ)/ρb(σ). Hence, σ(tA) is not
a best response for a tA-voter, a contradiction.
To see why the second step holds, consider separately τ(B|σb) ≥ τ(A|σa) and
τ(A|σa) > τ(B|σb). On the one hand, if τ(B|σb) ≥ τ(A|σa), then σins(A) ≥ 12
and the above relationship between pivot probability and vote share implies that
ρa(σ)/ρb(σ)≥ 1. However, 1 > (1− p¯tB)/p¯tB because voters lack confidence, and a tB-
voter best responds with σ(tB) only if ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) ≤ (1− p¯tB)/p¯tB . Hence, σ(tB) is not
a best response for a tB-voter. On the other hand, if τ(A|σa) > τ(B|σb), then similar
arguments show that σ(tA) is not a best response for a tA-voter. Since either case results
in a contradiction, σ must not have correct expected winners, completing the proof.
Theorem 1 only rules out equilibria, leaving open the question of which equilibria
exist. Proposition 1 shows that all players voting as if flipping a fair coin is an equilib-
rium. Neither asserts uniqueness of this equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If an ambiguous voting game  has voters who lack confidence, then the
symmetric strategy profile σˆ defined by σˆ(ti)(A)= 12 for all ti ∈ T is an equilibrium for .
To see why σˆ is an equilibrium, fix a voter i and suppose that all others play σˆ . Voter i
is equally likely to be pivotal in either a or b, so being pivotal does not give her any addi-
tional information. Moreover, if she did not vote, then her expected utilities conditional
on each state equal one another. Because she lacks confidence, her best response given
only her signal is to randomize fifty–fifty. Consequently, this strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium.
19The argument when utility is always higher conditional on b than on a is very similar.
878 Andrew Ellis Theoretical Economics 11 (2016)
In this equilibrium, both candidates are elected with equal probability regardless of
the state. Knowing the winner of the election does not provide any additional infor-
mation about which state obtains. Theorem 1 implies that an equilibrium resulting in
a higher probability of electing the correct candidate in one state of the world than σˆ
must result in a lower probability of electing the correct candidate in the other state of
the world than σˆ .
4.3 Sufficient condition for FIE
An implication of Theorem 1 is that FIE fails for any sequence of ambiguous voting
games in which voters lack confidence. In contrast, as long as the signal structure is
informative (the conditional distribution of signals varies with the state), any sequence
of SEU voting games satisfies FIE. Since SEU is a special case of MEU, some ambiguous
voting games satisfy FIE. However, SEU is not necessary for information to aggregate.
Theorem 2 proves the existence of a sequence of equilibria that aggregates information
whenever the game has disjoint posteriors.
Definition 5. An ambiguous voting game has disjoint posteriors if ra(ti) rb(ti) > 0 for
each ti ∈ T and for every distinct ti t ′i ∈ T ,
rb(ti)
ra(ti)
≤ rb(t
′
i)
ra(t
′
i)
⇒ (1− p¯)rb(ti)
p¯ra(ti)
≤ (1− ¯
p)rb(t
′
i)
¯
pra(t
′
i)
or, equivalently, that (
¯
pti  p¯ti )∩ ( ¯
pt ′i  p¯t
′
i
) is empty.
Disjoint posteriors requires that signals are sufficiently precise relative to the de-
gree of ex ante uncertainty. In an ambiguous voting game with disjoint posteriors,
the modeler can unambiguously rank signals by how likely a voter who sees it views
state a. If all voters are SEU, then the game has disjoint posteriors.20 Moreover, a suffi-
ciently small amount of ambiguity implies disjoint posteriors. Specifically, for any SEU
voting game with prior of a equal to π and signal distributions ra and rb such that
rb(ti)/ra(ti) = rb(t ′i)/ra(t ′i) for every distinct ti t ′i ∈ T , there is an  > 0 so that an am-
biguous voting game with the same signal distributions and a set priors that satisfies
¯
p= π −  and p¯= π +  has disjoint posteriors. In this sense, disjoint posteriors is close
to SEU.
An ambiguous voting game cannot have both disjoint posteriors and voters who
lack confidence.21 One can distinguish between SEU, disjoint posteriors, and voters
who lack confidence using Lemma 1 (in the Appendix). Consider an ambiguous voting
game . If  has singleton posteriors, then all voters act to maximize SEU and none
strictly prefers to randomize for any strategy profile. If  has disjoint posteriors, then for
20If p¯=
¯
p, then
¯
pt = p¯t for every t ∈ T , implying that ( ¯
pt p¯t )=∅ so ( ¯
pt p¯t )∩ ( ¯
pt′  p¯t′)=∅.
21Note that an ambiguous voting game may have neither disjoint posteriors nor voters who lack
confidence.
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any strategy profile at most one type of voter strictly prefers to randomize. If  has vot-
ers who lack confidence, then there exists a strategy profile such that all voters strictly
prefer randomizing to playing any pure strategy.
Any sequence of ambiguous voting games with disjoint posteriors and an informa-
tive signal structure satisfies FIE.
Theorem 2. For any sequence of ambiguous voting games with disjoint posteriors, there
exists a sequence of symmetric equilibria satisfying FIE.
The result shows the possibility of information aggregation under disjoint posteri-
ors. A sufficiently small amount of ambiguity does not preclude information aggrega-
tion. Because ambiguous voting games with disjoint posteriors are close to SEU vot-
ing games, there exists an equilibrium similar to that in those games. The proof adapts
the construction in Theorem 2 of Myerson (1998) to find a “step strategy” equilibrium.
Specifically, there is a p∗ that serves as a cutoff posterior of a: any voter who sees a signal
that leads to a set of posteriors that all assign a larger (resp. smaller) probability of a than
p∗ votes for A (resp. B). Otherwise, the voter plays a strategy—typically mixed—that in-
centivizes all voters to follow the strategy profile. If σ∗ is the limit of the sequence of
equilibrium strategies, then τ(A|σ∗ a)= τ(B|σ∗ b) > 12 , establishing FIE. Note that the
limiting σ∗ is also the limit of the sequence of equilibrium strategy profiles for an SEU
voting game with the same signal structure and an arbitrary prior.
For a class of symmetric ambiguous voting games that includes the game in Sec-
tion 2, Proposition 2 gives a complete characterization of those that satisfy FIE.
Proposition 2. If (n)∞n=1 is a sequence of ambiguous voting games where p¯ ≥ 12 ,
¯
p= 1− p¯, T = {12}, and ra(1) = rb(2) > 12 , then there exists a sequence of symmetric,
equilibrium strategy profiles that satisfy FIE if and only if ra(1)≥ p¯.
In words, information aggregates if and only if the information structure is suffi-
ciently precise relative to the degree of ex ante ambiguity. Proposition 2 follows from
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. If ra(1) ≥ p¯, then each n has disjoint posteriors. Apply-
ing Theorem 2 implies that (n)∞n=1 satisfies FIE. However, if p¯ > ra(1), then every n
has voters who lack confidence. Theorem 1 then implies that no symmetric equilibrium
strategy profile has correct expected winners, precluding FIE.
5. Robustness
This section explores the robustness of Theorem 1. I consider first allowing voters to
choose to abstain from voting. I also briefly discuss voters who perceive ambiguity about
the distribution of signals and the strategies of others. Neither variation affects the con-
clusion of Theorem 1.
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5.1 Abstention
In SEU voting games, abstention typically improves the outcome of the election. This
is due to the “swing voter’s curse”: given two SEU voters who observe different signals,
the voter whose signal conveys less information about the state of the world is more
likely to abstain in equilibrium (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996, 1999 or Bouton
and Castanheira 2009). Because the percentage of votes cast by more informed voters is
higher in an election with abstention compared to one with mandatory voting, allowing
abstention improves the expected outcome of the election. Ambiguous voting games
explicitly rule out the possibility of strategic abstention, leaving open the possibility that
the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails when voters can choose to abstain.
The main result of this subsection shows that if signals are distributed symmetrically,
then Theorem 1 holds when voters may abstain strategically. So as to allow for absten-
tion, modify the ambiguous voting games from Section 3 by allowing voters to abstain
(take action ∅) in addition to casting a vote for either of the two candidates. As before,
the candidate with the most votes wins, but abstention leaves open the possibility of a
tie. I assume that when candidates have the same number of votes, a fair coin flip de-
termines the winner. I define the equilibrium to such a game as in Section 3, except that
each voter’s strategy is a probability distribution over {AB∅} rather than over {AB}.
For tractability, I only analyze the game in which T = {12} and ra(1)= rb(2). Call such a
game an ambiguous voting game with abstention.
Theorem 3. Any symmetric equilibrium to an ambiguous voting game with abstention
where voters lack confidence does not have correct expected winners.
The proof follows the same steps as Theorem 1. However, the possibility of absten-
tion complicates the argument, particularly the first step of showing that any equilib-
rium with correct expected winners is close. The proof establishes this for symmetric
distributions of signals. An earlier version of this paper (Ellis 2012) in which the number
of voters followed a Poisson distribution extends Theorem 3 to many more distributions.
Theorem 3 provides insight into the mechanism behind Theorem 1, in that equilib-
rium behavior can be interpreted as an extreme swing voter’s curse. Each voter prefers
to minimize the chance that she casts a pivotal vote. If she abstained, then she would
never be pivotal, which would be better than any available strategy. However, Theorem 1
assumes that she must vote. Among her available choices, her best option is to mimic
abstention through a mixed strategy. When abstention is allowed and voters lack con-
fidence, even the voters who see more informative signals may abstain in equilibrium,
and allowing abstention need not alter the composition of vote shares.
Proposition 3. If  is an ambiguous voting game with abstention that has voters who
lack confidence, then for any s ∈ [01], the symmetric strategy profile σ∗ defined by
σ∗(ti)(∅) = s and σ∗(ti)(A) = σ∗(ti)(B) = (1− s)/2 for every ti ∈ T is an equilibrium
for .22
22This result generalizes immediately to the case where T is any finite set and ra and rb are unrestricted.
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Proposition 3 shows that the equilibrium expected turnout with MEU voters can be
anywhere between 0 and 100 percent. Of particular interest are the equilibrium where
σ∗(ti)(∅) = 0 for all ti ∈ T and the equilibrium where σ∗(ti)(∅) = 1 for all ti ∈ T . The
former equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 1, i.e., each player votes for every can-
didate with equal probability. In the latter equilibrium, all voters abstain with proba-
bility 1. Despite the different strategies, the expected outcome is the same for all of the
equilibria shown to exist by Proposition 3: each candidate is elected with equal proba-
bility, regardless of the state of the world that obtains. Consequently, the payoffs are the
same for each voter, as is the information that observing the outcome would provide to
an observer.
The equilibrium in which all voters abstain contrasts with Propositions 2 and 3
of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and Proposition 5 of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1999). In these papers, the fraction of voters who do not abstain remains bounded away
from 0 along any sequence of equilibria. These results are a consequence of SEU prefer-
ences: unlike when voters who lack confidence, if signals are information, one of them
will induces an SEU voter to prefer either a bet on a (voting for A) or a bet on b (voting
for B) to not making a bet (abstaining), at least for small stakes.
5.2 Ambiguity about signal distributions or strategies
As currently formulate, the model does not permit ambiguity about the conditional dis-
tribution of signals. Nonetheless, results extend as long as signals are conditionally in-
dependent, adapted as follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Say that the signal
of voter i is (·|s)-independent if for any acts f and g that are measurable with respect
to {{(s t) : ti = tˆ} : tˆ ∈ T } and {{(s t) : tj = tˆj ∀j = i} : tˆ ∈ TI\i}, respectively, (i) there exists
P0 ∈ (·|s) so that P0 ∈ argminπ∈(·|s)
∫
u ◦ f dπ and P0 ∈ argminπ∈(·|s)
∫
u ◦ gdπ, and
(ii) u ◦ f and u ◦ g are stochastically independent random variables with respect to any
extreme point of (·|s). Proposition 4.2 of that paper shows that independence requires
that the set of priors consists of product measures. Formally, signals are conditionally
independent if the signal of every voter i is (·|s)-independent for each s ∈ S. Many
papers studying games with incomplete information under ambiguity implicitly or ex-
plicitly assume independence, such as Bose et al. (2006), Chen et al. (2007), and Bose
and Daripa (2009).23
With this definition in mind, consider the set of priors defined by π ∈ if and only if
there exists a p ∈ [
¯
p p¯] and an rs in the convex hull of {⊗i∈I rsi : rsi ∈Rs ∀i ∈ I} for each
s ∈ S so that
π(a t)= pra(t) and π(b t)= (1−p)rb(t)
for all (s t) ∈ 
, where each Rs is a closed, convex, nonempty set of probability distri-
butions over T . Conditional on state s, the signal that voter i observes is distributed
23Other papers, such as Lo (1999) or Bodoh-Creed (2012), instead consider sets of priors with the form
{μ ⊗ μ ⊗ · · · ⊗ μ : μ ∈ }. This reflects that all types are distributed independently according to the same
distribution. The results mentioned below also hold if both sets of posteriors have this form.
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according to one of the distributions in the set Rs. Again, the above notions of utility,
strategies, and equilibrium generalize naturally. In the Supplement, I prove the analog
of Theorem 1: no equilibrium strategy profile has correct expected winners if voters lack
confidence, when both properties are suitably generalized.
Now consider ambiguity about the strategies of other players. Studying this requires
the introduction of a new equilibrium concept, and one must make a crucial model-
ing decision: whether ambiguity about another player’s strategy arises completely en-
dogenously (as in Lo 1996) or at least partially exogenously (as in Klibanoff 1996). Such
an extension is beyond the scope of this paper, but incorporating ambiguity about the
strategies of others seems unlikely to change the main conclusions. Intuitively, the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem shows that the strategy played by an SEU voter given her correct
perception of other voters’ strategies leads to information aggregation, and if other vot-
ers’ strategies are ambiguous, then a player no longer correctly perceives them. This
decreases the informational content of the pivotal event even further, so one should not
expect information to aggregate. Moreover, it increases the uncertainty and thus the
incentive for a voter to hedge against ambiguity.
6. Conclusion
Theorem 1 shows that rational but ambiguity averse voters may find it optimal to insure
themselves by minimizing the chance they cast a pivotal vote. This leads to a failure of
information aggregation not documented by previous work. The literature shows that
the dimensionality of the uncertainty and the degree of commonality between voters
are important in evaluating the efficiency of the election. In contrast, this paper suggests
that how familiar the electorate is with the issues at stake also matters. By way of con-
clusion, this section reviews some of these results and contrasts them with Theorem 1.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) prove that if the distribution of preferences is un-
known, then FIE fails generically. The problem is one of dimensionality; namely, each
voter must infer both the distribution of signals and the distribution of preferences from
these votes. Even if a voter knew which votes others cast and the electorate were large,
she could not infer the state of the world. In contrast, this paper assumes common
knowledge of the distribution of preferences. However, the distribution of votes may not
vary with the state (Proposition 1) because voters insure themselves against ambiguity
by abstaining or randomizing.
Mandler (2012) shows that if the conditional distribution of signals is unknown, then
FIE may fail. If all the signals were observed by each voter, then uncertainty would re-
main as to which state is correct even as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. In this
paper, if all signals were observed, then the true state would be known with probability
approaching 1 despite the prior ambiguity.
Bhattacharya (2013) drops the assumption of common values and characterizes the
distributions of preferences for which FIE fails. For instance, FIE fails when any voter
who receives information in favor of the Condorcet winner with perfect information is
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very likely to strongly prefer the other candidate.24 In contrast, this paper maintains
pure common values.
Finally, the result in this paper relates to work that studies the effect of ambiguous
information in other contexts. For instance, Condie and Ganguli (2011) demonstrate
a failure of information transmission with ambiguity averse agents in general equilib-
rium. They show that a rational expectations equilibrium for an exchange economy
may be partially revealing when agents are ambiguity averse; in contrast, fully revealing
equilibria are generic with SEU agents. Two differences are worth pointing out. First, in
their model agents do not act strategically—they are price takers. Second, they assume
that only a subset of agents are ambiguity averse, while an ambiguous voting game has
voters who lack confidence only if all voters are ambiguity averse.
Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
A.1.1 Preliminary results for the proof of Theorem 1 This section contains three pre-
liminary results that will be used to prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Lemma 1 estab-
lishes the form of a voter’s best response correspondence. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 establish
how a change in vote share alters θs(σ) and ρs(σ). When it will not cause confusion,
the strategy profile is suppressed as an argument in the function θs and ρs (defined in
Section 3). Throughout, a strategy is indexed solely by the probability of playing A. This
is without loss of generality since σi(t)(B)= 1− σi(t)(A).
Lemma 1. If σ∗ is a symmetric equilibrium, σ∗(ti)(A) ∈ BRti (σ∗)(A) for all ti ∈ T , where
BRti (σ)(A)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{0} if θa ≥ θb + ρb and ρa(σ)ρb(σ) <
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
or θb ≥ θa + ρa and ρa(σ)ρb(σ) <
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
[01] if θa ≥ θb + ρb and ρa(σ)ρb(σ) =
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
or θb ≥ θa + ρa and ρa(σ)ρb(σ) =
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
{1} if θa ≥ θb + ρb and 1−¯pti
¯
pti
< ρa(σ)ρb(σ)
or θb ≥ θa + ρa and 1−p¯tip¯ti <
ρa(σ)
ρb(σ)
BˆRti (σ)(A) otherwise
24Additionally, the nonaggregation result in this paper is stronger because of his more demanding defi-
nition of FIE, which requires the definition of FIE from this paper to hold for every sequence of symmetric,
Bayesian Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. Unlike Theorem 1, his conditions do not rule out the
existence of a different equilibrium in which information would aggregate. For example, the game depicted
by his Figure 1 fails his definition of FIE but satisfies the definition in this paper.
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and
BˆRti (σ)(A)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{0} if ρa(σ)ρb(σ) <
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
[0 s¯(σ)] if ρa(σ)ρb(σ) =
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
{s¯(σ)} if 1−p¯tip¯ti <
ρa(σ)
ρb(σ)
<
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
[s¯(σ)1] if 1−¯pti
¯
pti
= ρa(σ)ρb(σ)
{1} if 1−¯pti
¯
pti
< ρa(σ)ρb(σ)
,
where s¯(σ)= (θb − θa + ρb)/(ρa + ρb).
Proof. A player of type ti has a best response to σ of playing A with probability s if s
maximizes Vti(sσ).
Consider the case where θa ≥ θb + ρb. Note that
Vti(sσ) = min
p∈[
¯
pti p¯ti ]
{
p[sρa + θa] + (1−p)[(1− s)ρb + θb]
}
=
¯
pti [sρa + θa] + (1− ¯
pti)[(1− s)ρb + θb]
because for every s, sρa + θa ≥ (1− s)ρb + θb. Clearly Vti(·σ) is increasing if and only if
¯
ptiρa > (1− ¯
pti)ρb, decreasing if and only if ¯
ptiρa < (1− ¯
pti)ρb, and constant if and only
if
¯
ptiρa = (1− ¯
pti)ρb. Hence, BRti (σ) has the desired form, and dual arguments establish
the claim when θa + ρa ≤ θb.
Now, suppose that θa < θb + ρb and θa + ρa > θb. The term Vti(·σ) is not differen-
tiable everywhere, but since it is concave (as a minimum of a set of linear functions),
the superdifferential (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border 1999) exists everywhere. Adapted
to this setting, the superdifferential is given by
∂Vti(sσ)=
{
x ∈R : Vti(yσ)≤ Vti(sσ)+
∑
ω
(y − s)x ∀y ∈ [01]
}

By Lemma 7.10 of Aliprantis and Border (1999), the best response correspondence is the
set of all s such that 0 ∈ ∂Vti(sσ).
There exists an s¯ ∈ (01) so that the conditional utilities in A and B are equal. Fur-
ther, if s > s¯, then conditional utility in state a is larger than that in state b, and if s < s¯,
then the utility in state B is larger than that in state A. Algebra shows that
s¯ = θb − θa + ρb
ρa + ρb 
Since for all s ∈ (0 s¯) and every s ∈ (s¯1) the minimizer is unique, the derivative of
Vti(·σ) exists and coincides with the superdifferential whenever s /∈ {0 s¯1}. If s ∈ (s¯1),
then
∂Vti(sσ)=
{
∂
∂s
Vti(sσ)
}
= {
¯
ptiρa − (1− ¯
pti)ρb}
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so any s ∈ (s¯1) is an optimum only if
¯
ptiρa = (1 − ¯
pti)ρb. Similarly, any s ∈ (0 s¯) is an
optimum when p¯tiρa = (1− p¯ti )ρb. Otherwise the optimum must be in {0 s¯1}.
When s = 1, the superdifferential exists and equals
∂Vti(1σ)= {x ∈R : Vti(yσ)− Vti(1σ)≤ (y − 1)x ∀y ≤ 1}
Since Vti(yσ)− Vti(1σ) is equal to
(y − 1)(
¯
ptiρa − (1− ¯
pti)ρb)
0 ∈ ∂Vti(1σ) if and only if
Vti(yσ)− Vti(1σ)≤ 0 ⇐⇒ ¯
ptiρa > (1− ¯
pti)ρb
Hence s = 1 is an optimum only if
¯
ptiρa > (1− ¯
pti)ρb. Similar arguments show that s = 0
is an optimum if and only if 0 ∈ ∂Vti(0σ) ⇐⇒ p¯tiρa < (1− p¯ti )ρb.
Now consider the strategy s¯. In this case,
∂Vti(s¯σ)= {pρa − (1−p)ρb : p ∈ [ ¯
pti  p¯ti ]}
so 0 ∈ ∂Vt(s¯σ) if and only if p¯tiρa−(1− p¯ti )ρb ≥ 0 and ¯
ptiρa−(1− ¯
pti)ρb ≤ 0. Combining
the above statements yields the desired form of BRti (σ). 
I establish following three facts that will be used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2. For any symmetric strategy profile σ , θa(σ) ≥ θb(σ) ⇐⇒ τ(A|σa) ≥
τ(B|σb).
Proof. Write θa(σ)=∑2nm=n+1 (2nm)τ(A|σa)m(1− τ(A|σa))2n−m and note that
∂θa
∂τ(A|σa) = (2n)
(
2n− 1
n
)
τ(A|σa)n(1− τ(A|σa))n−1 > 0
See the Supplement for the algebra. Similarly
∂θb
∂τ(B|σb) = (2n)
(
2n− 1
n
)
τ(B|σb)n(1− τ(B|σb))n−1 > 0
Since θa(σ) = 0 if τ(A|σa) = 0 and θb(σ) = 0 if τ(B|σb) = 0, conclude that θa(σ) ≥
θb(σ) ⇐⇒ τ(A|σa)≥ τ(B|σb). 
Lemma 3. For any symmetric strategy profile σ , ρa(σ) ≥ ρb(σ) ⇐⇒ |τ(A|σa) − 12 | ≤
|τ(B|σb)− 12 |.
Proof. Since ρs(σ)=
(2n
n
)
τ(A|σ s)n(1− τ(A|σ s))n,
∂ρs(σ)
∂τ(A|σ s) = 2n
(
2n− 1
n− 1
)
τ(A|σ s)n−1(1− τ(A|σ s))n−1[(1− 2τ(A|σ s))]
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See the Supplement for the algebra. Integrating the above derivative from 12 to τ(A|σ s)
yields the result. 
Lemma 4. If σ is a symmetric strategy profile with correct expected winners, then
τ(A|σa)≥ τ(B|σb) ⇐⇒ s¯(σ)≤ 12 .
Proof. Note that s¯(σ) ≤ 12 ⇐⇒ 2θb(σ) + ρb(σ) ≤ 2θa(σ) + ρa(σ). Lemma 3 shows
that ∂pa(σ)/∂τ(A|σa)∂pb(σ)/∂τ(B|σb) > 0 whenever expected winners are correct.
Lemma 2 shows that ∂θa/∂τ(A|σa)∂θb/∂τ(B|σb) > 0. Moreover, when τ(A|σa) =
τ(B|σb), ∂pa(σ)/∂τ(A|σa), ∂pb(σ)/∂τ(B|σb) and ∂θa/∂τ(A|σa) = ∂θb/∂τ(B|σb).
Integrating from τ(A|σa) = τ(B|σb) = 12 establishes that when expected winners are
correct, τ(A|σa)≥ τ(B|σb) if and only if s¯(σ)≤ 12 . 
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that voters lack con-
fidence and that σ is a symmetric equilibrium where 12 < τ(A|σa) and 12 < τ(B|σb).
There must exist tA tB ∈ T such that σ(tA)(A) > 12 and σ(tB)(A) < 12 . The first step is to
show that BRti (σ)= BˆRti (σ) for all ti ∈ T . The second step shows that either tA or tB will
not follow σ .
For the first step, if BRti (σ) = BˆRti (σ), then either
θa ≥ θb + ρb (A.1)
or
θb ≥ θa + ρa (A.2)
must hold by Lemma 1.
If (A.1) holds, then θa > θb. Lemma 2 implies that τ(A|aσ) > τ(B|bσ). Lemma 3
implies ρb(σ) > ρa(σ). But (1− ¯
ptA)/ ¯
ptA > 1 because voters lack confidence, so
(1−
¯
ptA)/ ¯
ptA > ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) and Lemma 1 implies σ(tA)(A)= 0, a contradiction.
If instead (A.2) holds, then θb > θa. Lemma 2 implies τ(B|σb) > τ(A|σa). Lemma 3
implies ρa(σ) > ρb(σ). But (1− p¯tB)/p¯tB < 1 because voters lack confidence, so
ρa(σ)/ρb(σ)≤ (1− p¯tB)/p¯tB and Lemma 1 implies σ(tB)(B)= 0, a contradiction.
For the second step, either τ(A|aσ) ≤ τ(B|bσ) or τ(A|aσ) > τ(B|bσ). In the
first case τ(A|aσ) ≤ τ(B|bσ), so Lemma 4 implies s¯(σ) ≥ 12 and Lemma 3 implies
ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) > 1. But (1− p¯tB)/p¯tB < 1 since voters lack confidence, so Lemma 1 implies
that σ(tB)(A)≥ s¯(σ)≥ 12 , a contradiction.
In the second case τ(A|aσ) > τ(B|bσ), so Lemma 4 implies s¯(σ) < 12 and Lemma 3
implies ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) < 1. But 1 < (1− ¯
ptA)/ ¯
ptA since voters lack confidence, so
Lemma 1 implies that σ(tA)(A) < s¯(σ) ≤ 12 , a contradiction. Because both cases re-
sult in a contradiction, there cannot exist a strategy profile that has correct expected
winners, completing the proof.
A.2 Proofs of remaining results not in the text
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose σ is played. Clearly, θa(σ) = θb(σ) and
ρa(σ) = ρb(σ). Lemma 1 implies that BRti (σ) = BˆRti (σ) for all ti. Further, note that
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ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) = 1 since the vote shares are equal in both states. Since ρa(σ)/ρb(σ) ∈
((1− p¯ti )/p¯ti  (1− ¯
pti)/ ¯
pti), voter i of type ti has a unique best response to play
σi(ti)(A)= sˆ(Aσ)= 12 . Therefore, σ is an equilibrium, completing the proof.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 2 Relabel T = {12    T } so that
ra(1)
rb(1)
<
ra(2)
rb(2)
< · · ·< ra(T)
rb(T)

The labeling and disjoint posteriors imply that p¯1 ≤ ¯
p2 ≤ p¯2 ≤ ¯
p3 ≤ · · · ≤ p¯T . Denote
by [h] the largest integer less than h and by σ(h) for each h ∈ [0T ] the strategy profile
such that σi(t)(A) = 0 if t ≤ [h], σi(t)(A) = 1 if t > [h], and σi([h])(A)= h− [h] for all i.
The proof will show that for all n high enough, there is an h(n) so that σ(h(n)) is an
equilibrium and that the expected winner in a is A and the expected winner in b is B.
There exists numbers I(a) < I(b) so that
τ(A|σ(I(s)) s)= τ(B|σ(I(s)) s)
for each s ∈ {ab}. Since there is some t so that ra(t) = rb(t),
τ(A|σ(I(s)) s) = τ(B|σ(I(s)) s)
for s = ab. For every h ∈ (I(a) I(b)), τ(A|σ(h)a) > τ(B|σ(h)a) and τ(B|σ(h)b) >
τ(A|σ(h)b).
Label ρs and θs in the game n (which has 2n+ 1 players) by ρns and θns , and define
β(hn)= ρna(σ(h))/ρnb(σ(h)). Note that
β(I(a)n)= ρ
n
a(σ(I(a)))
ρnb(σ(I(a)))
=
1
4
n
[τ(A|σ(I(s))b)τ(B|σ(I(s))b)]n → ∞
as n→ ∞. Similarly,
β(I(b)n)= ρ
n
a(σ(I(b)))
ρnb(σ(I(b)))
= [τ(A|σ(I(s))a)τ(B|σ(I(s))a)]
n
1
4
n → 0
as n → ∞. Therefore, there exists n∗ such that β(I(a)n∗) > (1−
¯
p1)/ ¯
p1 and
β(I(b)n∗) < (1− p¯T )/p¯T .
Consider fixed n. Define the function z : [0T ] → [01] by the formula
z(h) :=
⎧⎨
⎩
s¯(σ(h)) s¯(σ(h)) ∈ [01]
1 s¯(σ(h)) > 1
0 s¯(σ(h)) < 0,
where s¯(σ(h)) is defined in Lemma 1 using θns (σ(h)) and ρ
n
s (σ(h)). If z(h) < 0, then
θnb(σ(h))+ ρnb(σ(h)) < θna(σ(h))
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so
BRt (σ(h))=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 β(hn) >
1−
¯
pt
¯
pt
[01] β(hn)= 1−¯pt
¯
pt
0 β(hn) <
1−
¯
pt
¯
pt
by Lemma 1. Similarly, if z(h) > 1, then
θa(σ(h))+ ρa(σ(h)) < θb(σ(h))
so
BRt (σ)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 β(hn) > 1−p¯tp¯t
[01] β(hn)= 1−p¯tp¯t
0 β(hn) < 1−p¯tp¯t
by Lemma 1. Otherwise, BRt (σ)(A)= BˆRt (σ)(A).
Given the above notes, Lemma 1 shows that σ(h) is an equilibrium if β(h) ∈ η(h),
where
η(h)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
[ 1−p¯hp¯h 
1−
¯
ph+1
¯
ph+1 ] h ∈ Z
1−p¯[h]
p¯[h] h ∈ ([h] + z(h) [h] + 1)
[ 1−¯p[h]
¯
p[h] 
1−p¯[h]
p¯[h] ] h= [h] + z(h)
1−
¯
p[h]
¯
p[h] h ∈ ([h] [h] + z(h)).
The term s¯(σ(h)) is a continuous function ofh by construction. It follows that z(·) is con-
tinuous since it can be written as the minimum of two continuous functions. Therefore
η(·) is upper hemicontinuous, compact, and convex.
For every n > n∗, there exists h(n) ∈ [I(a) I(b)] so that β(h(n)n) ∈ η(h(n)) because
β(·) is continuous and η(·) is convex and upper hemicontinuous. Moreover, by the
above discussion, this fixed point must be in the interior. Since h(n) ∈ (I(a) I(b)),
τ(A|σ(h(n))a) > τ(B|σ(h(n))a) and τ(B|σ(h(n))b) > τ(A|σ(h(n))b). Conclude
that σ(h(n)) is an equilibrium to n.
Since n was taken arbitrarily, there is an h(n) that defines an equilibrium for every
n so that n > n∗. Define σ∗n = σ(h(n)) for n > n∗; otherwise, let σ∗n be an arbitrary equi-
librium. The sequence (σ∗n)∞n=1 of strategy profiles is all equilibrium, and both sequences
τ(A|σ∗na) and τ(B|σ∗nb) must converge and must converge so that limτ(A|σ∗na) =
limτ(B|σ∗nb) > 12 (see, e.g., Myerson 1998). Picking  ∈ (0 limτ(A|σ∗na)− 12) establishes
that (n)∞n=1 satisfies FIE, completing the proof.
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A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 3 Begin by introducing some notation. Write the voter’s utility
(slightly abusing notation) as
Vti(σi(ti);σ−i) = min
π∈ti
E[ui|tiσ−iσi]
≡ Vti
(
σi(ti)(A)
σi(ti)(A)+ σi(ti)(B)σi(ti)(∅);σ
)

where (as long as τ(∅|σa) < 1)
Vti(xα;σ) = min
π∈[
¯
pti p¯ti ]
[
π
{
θa(σ)+ (1− α)[xρAa(σ)− (1− x)ρBa(σ)]
}
(A.3)
+ (1−π){θb(σ)+ (1− α)[(1− x)ρBb(σ)− xρAb(σ)]}]
for ca =A, cb = B, τ∗(c|σ s)= τ(c|σ s)/(1− τ(∅|σ s)),
θs(σ) =
2n∑
m=1
f (m;1− τ(∅|σ s)2n)U(τ∗(cs|σ s)m)
ρcs(σ) =
2n∑
m=0
f (m;1− τ(∅|σ s)2n)γ(τ∗(cs|σ s)m)
U(pm) =
{
1− F( 12(m+ 1);pm) if m odd
1− F( 12m;pm)+ 12f ( 12m;pm) if m even
and γ(pm) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2f (
1
2(m− 1);pm) if m odd
1
2f (
1
2m;pm) if m> 0 and even
1 if m= 0,
where f (·) and F(·) are the probability mass function and cumulative distribution of
the binomial distribution, respectively. If τ(∅|σa) = 1 (which implies τ(∅|σb) = 1),
Vti(xα;σ)=minπ∈[¯pti p¯ti ]
(1−α)[πx+ (1−π)(1−x)] + 12 . When it will not cause confu-
sion, I write ρcs for ρcs(σ) and θs for θs(σ).
The function U gives the expected probability of candidate c winning, conditional
on m votes cast with a p probability of each being cast for c and on voter i abstaining.
The function γ gives the probability that a vote for candidate A (B) would change the
election from a tie to winning or from B (A) winning to a tie, conditional on m votes cast
with a p probability of each being cast for A (B) and on voter i abstaining.
If ra(1)= 12 , then rb(1) = ra(1), so information aggregation is impossible. Therefore,
assume without loss of generality that ra(1) > 12 . For the sake of contradiction, assume
there exists σ with correct expected winners. In particular, σ(1)(A)/σ(1)(B) > 1 and
σ(2)(A)/σ(2)(B) < 1.
Lemma 5. If σ is an equilibriumwith correct expected winners, then
E[ui|aσ−iσi(t)(A)= 1]> E[ui|bσ−iσi(t)(A)= 1]
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and
E[ui|bσ−iσi(t)(B)= 1]> E[ui|aσ−iσi(t)(B)= 1]
Proof. Note that θb(σ) + ρBb(σ) = E[ui|bσ−iσi(t)(B) = 1] and E[ui|aσ−i
σi(t)(B)= 1] = θa(σ)− ρBa(σ). Suppose not, so
θb(σ)+ ρBb(σ)≤ θa(σ)− ρBa(σ)
(the other case follows from reversing the roles of a and b and the roles of A and B).
After updating, each voter regards state b as the worst state and a voter of type ti uses
the posterior assigning probability
¯
pti to a. Best responses are as in an SEU game with a
prior assigning probability
¯
p to a.
By standard arguments (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996), no voter mixes
between A and B. Voters who observe signal 1 have at least as much incentive to
vote for A as those who observe signal 2. Therefore, if expected winners are correct,
σ(1)(A)σ(2)(B) > 0. This requires that 1< (1−
¯
p1)/ ¯
p1 ≤ (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb)≤
(1−
¯
p2)/ ¯
p2, and the following two facts establish a contradiction.
Given expected winners are correct, σ(1)(B)= 0, σ(2)(A)= 0, and ra(1)= rb(1) > 12 ,
(ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb)≥ 1 if and only if σ(1)(∅) < σ(2)(∅). Note that
ρAs + ρBs =
n∑
i=0
f (2i;τ∅2n)f (i;τ∗A2i)
+
n−1∑
i=0
f (2i+ 1;τ∅2n) 12 [f (i;τ∗A2i+ 1)+ f (i+ 1;τ∗A2i+ 1)]
where τ∅ = τ(∅|σ s) and τ∗A = τ∗(A|σ s). As |τ∗(A|σ s)− 12 | increases, the election gets
less close in state s, and ρAs+ρBs decreases because both f (i;p2i) and f (i;p2i+1)+
f (i + 1;p2i + 1) decrease as |p− 12 | increases. Similarly, as τ(∅|σ s) decreases, voters
become more likely to vote, and ρAs + ρBs decreases because more weight gets put
on higher populations. See the Supplement for the algebra. Since τ(A|σa) = ra(1) >
(1− σ(2)(∅))ra(1)= τ(B|σb) > 12 and τ(∅|σb)= σ(2)(∅)ra(1) > σ(2)(∅)(1− ra(1))=
τ(∅|σa), (ρBb + ρAb)/(ρAa + ρBa) > 1.
Given expected winners are correct, σ(1)(B)= 0, σ(2)(A)= 0, and ra(1)= rb(1) > 12 ,
θa(σ) ≥ θb(σ) if and only if σ(1)(∅) < σ(2)(∅). This follows from observing that
U(τ(cs|σ s)/(τ(B|σ s)+ τ(A|σ s))m) increases in τ(cs|σ s)/(τ(B|σ s)+ τ(A|σ s)) and
decreases in m. See the Supplement for the algebra. As σ(1)(∅) increases, more weight
is put on lower values of m and τ(A|σa)/(τ(B|σa)+ τ(A|σa)) decreases. Simultane-
ously, τ(B|σb)/(τ(B|σb)+ τ(A|σb)) increases. This decreases θa(σ) relative to θb(σ).
The first fact implies that σ(1)(∅) < σ(2)(∅). The second fact implies that θb(σ) >
θa(σ). But then θb(σ)+ ρBb(σ) ≤ θa(σ)− ρBa(σ) is impossible, establishing the con-
tradiction. 
Lemma 6. If σ is a symmetric equilibrium with correct expected winners, then no type
mixes betweenA and B.
Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) Condorcet meets Ellsberg 891
Proof. If
¯
pti [ρAa + ρBa] > (1 − ¯
pti)[ρAb + ρBb], then differentiating (A.3) shows that
σ(ti) such that σ(ti)(A) = s and σ(t)(∅)= 1− s is strictly better than any distinct σ ′(ti)
with σ ′(ti)(∅)= 1− s. Similarly if (1− p¯ti )[ρAb + ρBb]> p¯t[ρAa + ρBa], then a σ(ti) with
σ(ti)(B)= s and σ(ti)(∅)= 1− s is strictly better than any distinct σ ′(ti) with σ ′(ti)(∅)=
1− s.
Consider the case where none of these holds, i.e., (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti ≥ (ρBb + ρAb)/
(ρAa + ρBa)≥ (1− ¯
pti)/ ¯
pti . Let s¯(ασ) be the probability of voting for A that equalizes
utility in a and b given the voter abstains with probability α, i.e., s¯(ασ) solves
[s¯(ρAa + ρBa)− ρBa](1− α)+ θa = [ρBb − s¯(ρBb + ρAb)](1− α)+ θb
for s¯ and s¯(ασ) = (θb − θa)/((1− α)
∑
ρcs)+ (ρBa + ρBb)/
∑
ρcs. Note that s < s¯(ασ)
is evaluated with p¯ti and s > s¯(ασ) is evaluated with ¯
pti , so in either case, Vti(sα;σ) <
Vti(s¯(ασ)α;σ).
At σ(ti)(A)= s¯(ασ) (when 0≤ s¯(ασ)≤ 1), utility in each state is equal. Specifically,
the utility of playing σαins where σ
α
ins(A) = (1 − α)s¯(ασ), σαins(B) = (1 − α)[1 − s¯(ασ)],
and σαins(∅)= α is
Vti(σ
α
insα;σ)= θa +
(θb − θa)(ρAa + ρBa)+ ρAaρBb − ρBaρAb∑
ρcs
+ αρBaρAb − ρAaρBb∑
ρcs

If expected winners are correct, then ρBb < ρAb and ρAa < ρBa. Hence σαins gives less
utility than abstaining with probability slightly higher than α. Consequently, a voter
either mixes between A and ∅ or between B and ∅. 
In light of Lemma 6, index strategies by {AB}×[01]∪{∅}, with (cα) corresponding
to σ(t)(c)= (1− α) and σ(t)(∅)= α, and ∅ corresponding to σ(t)(∅)= 1.
Lemma 7. If (1−
¯
pti)/ ¯
pti < (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) and σ is a symmetric equilibrium
with correct expected winners, then σ(ti) ∈ BRti (σ), where
BRti (σ)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{∅} if ρAaρAb <
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
{A} × [α∗A1] if
ρAa
ρAb
= 1−p¯tip¯ti
{(Aα∗A)} if
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
<
ρAa
ρAb
<
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
{A} × [0α∗A] if
ρAa
ρAb
= 1−¯pti
¯
pti
{(A0)} if ρAaρAb >
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
for α∗A =max{min{1+ (θa − θb)/(ρAa + ρAb)1}0}.
Proof. Since (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) is large enough, (Aα) is better than (Bα). Note
that
Vti(1α;σ)= min
p∈[
¯
pti p¯ti ]
p[(1− α)ρAa + θa] + (1−p)[θb − (1− α)ρAb]
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Utility in a is larger than b if and only if α ≤ 1 + (θa − θb)/(ρAa + ρAb) = α∗A
(algebra given in the Supplement). Consequently, α < α∗A implies ∂Vti(Aα) =
{(1 −
¯
pti)ρAb − ¯
ptiρAa}, α > α∗A implies ∂Vti(1α;σ) = {(1 − p¯ti )ρAb − p¯tiρAa},
and α = α∗A implies ∂Vti(1α;σ) = [(1 − ¯
pti)ρAb − ¯
ptiρAa (1 − p¯ti )ρAb − p¯tiρAa].
The result follows from α optimal if and only if 0 ∈ ∂Vti(1α;σ). 
Lemma 8. If (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti > (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) and σ is a symmetric equilibrium
with correct expected winners, then σ(ti) ∈ BRti (σ), where
BRt (σ)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{(B0)} if ρBaρBb <
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
{B} × [0α∗B] if ρBaρBb =
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
{(Bα∗B)} if
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
>
ρBa
ρBb
>
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
{B} × [α∗B1] if ρBaρBb =
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
{∅} if ρBaρBb >
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
for α∗B =max{min{1+ (θb − θa)/(ρBa + ρBb)1}0}.
Proof. Since (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) is small enough, (Bα) is better than (Aα). So
the problem is only choosing α. Then
Vti(0α;σ)= min
p∈[
¯
pti p¯ti ]
p[θa − (1− α)ρBa] + (1−p)[θb + (1− α)ρBb]
Utility in a is larger than b if and only if α∗B = 1 + (θb − θa)/(ρBb + ρBa) ≤ α (algebra
given in the Supplement). So α > α∗B implies ∂Vti(0α;σ) = {(1 − ¯
pti)ρBb − ¯
ptiρBa},
α< α∗B implies ∂Vti(0α;σ)= {(1− p¯ti )ρBb − p¯tiρBa}, and α= α∗B implies ∂Vti(0α;σ)=
[(1−
¯
pti)ρBb − ¯
ptiρBa (1− p¯ti )ρBb − p¯tiρBa]. The result follows from α optimal if and
only if 0 ∈ ∂Vti(0α;σ). 
Lemma 9. If (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti ≤ (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb)≤ (1− ¯
pti)/ ¯
pti and σ is a symmetric
equilibriumwith correct expected winners, then σ(t) ∈ BRt (σ), where
BRt (σ)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{(Aα∗A)} if
ρAa
ρAb
>
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
and θb > θa
{A} × [α∗A1] if
ρAa
ρAb
= 1−p¯tip¯ti and θb > θa
{∅} if θa = θb or ρAaρAb <
1−p¯ti
p¯ti
and θb > θa
or
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
<
ρBa
ρBb
and θa > θb
{B} × [α∗B1] if
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
= ρBaρBb and θa > θb
{(Bα∗B)} if
1−
¯
pti
¯
pti
>
ρBa
ρBb
and θa > θb
for α∗A, α
∗
B as defined above.
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Proof. Suppose first θa = θb. By Lemma 6, abstaining with probability 1 is the only best
response.
Now suppose θb > θa, so α∗A < 1 and α
∗
B = 1. By the arguments in Lemma 6,
(Bα) cannot be a maximizer unless α = 1. If α > α∗A, then the minimizing pos-
terior of Vti(1α;σ) equals p¯ti . As long as α ≥ α∗A, Vti(1α;σ) is decreasing in α if
ρAa/ρAb > (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti , increasing in α if ρAa/ρAb < (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti , and constant in
α if ρAa/ρAb = (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti . Hence ρAa/ρAb < (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti implies Vti(Aα;σ) is
maximized at α = 1, ρAa/ρAb = (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti implies Vti(Aα;σ) is maximized at any
α ∈ [α∗A1], and ρAa/ρAb > (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti implies Vti(Aα;σ) is maximized at α= α∗. To
see why the latter is a global maximum, Lemma 6 shows that for α < α∗A, Vti(xα;σ) ≤
Vti(s¯(ασ)α;σ) for any x ∈ [01], Vti(s¯(ασ)α;σ) is increasing and continuous in α,
and s¯(ασ) approaches 1 as α approaches α∗A. Hence, Vti(1α
∗
A;σ) is a global optimum
when ρAa/ρAb > (1− p¯ti )/p¯ti .
Dual arguments hold when considering θa > θb. 
Before completing the proof, note the following statements. First, ra(1) > 12 > rb(1)
implies (1− p¯1)/p¯1 < (1− p¯2)/p¯2 < (1− ¯
p1)/ ¯
p1 < (1− ¯
p2)/ ¯
p2. Second, given Lemma 6,
if expected winners are correct, then σ(1)(A) > 0 and σ(2)(B) > 0. Third, given
that σ(2)(A) = σ(1)(B) = 0, (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ σ(1)(∅) ≤ σ(2)(∅); see
Lemma 5. Finally, again given σ(2)(A) = σ(1)(B) = 0, θa(σ) ≥ θb(σ) ⇐⇒ σ(1)(∅) ≥
σ(2)(∅); see Lemma 5.
Consider separately σ(1)(∅) ≥ σ(2)(∅) and σ(1)(∅) < σ(2)(∅). On the one hand,
if σ(1)(∅) ≥ σ(2)(∅), then (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) ≥ 1 and θa(σ) ≤ θb(σ). But then
Lemmas 8 and 9 imply σ(2)(B) = 0, a contradiction. On the other hand, if σ(1)(∅) <
σ(2)(∅), then (ρAa + ρBa)/(ρBb + ρAb) < 1 and θa(σ) > θb(σ). But then Lemmas 7 and 9
imply σ(1)(A)= 0, a contradiction. The conclusion is that expected winners cannot be
correct, completing the proof.
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